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Casenote; Paschen v. Paschen: When a Gift Is Not Just a Gift
Constance Van Kley
The guiding principle of child support is “to meet the needs of
the child according to the financial ability of the parents.”1 In Paschen v.
Paschen,2 the Montana Supreme Court reviewed a divorce proceeding
that presented a novel child support question: Should gifts factor into
determination of maintenance and child support payments? Undermining
the guiding principle of child support, a five-justice panel unanimously
held gifts should not be a factor.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Herb Paschen (“Herb”) and Anne Kemsley (“Anne”), married in
1996 and had three children together before separating in 2011 and filing
for divorce in 2012.3 During the marriage and subsequent separation,
Anne stayed home with their children, earning little to no outside
income.4 She knew little about the family’s finances; in fact, the record
suggests that Herb hid the source and amount of a substantial amount of
money.5 For example, Anne testified that she believed the family had
brought in only $75,000 annually from 2007 to 2010, all of which had
been gifted by Herb’s mother.6 In fact, Herb spent over $1.7 million
during that time. At trial, he apparently could not remember the source of
the money or where it went.7
In 2015, the district court issued a final order dissolving the
marriage, distributing marital assets and allocating marital debt.8 The
court allocated approximately $16,000 in debt to Anne and over $5.5
million to Herb.9 Acknowledging the “grossly disproportionate
allocation,” the court determined that the assignment was appropriate
because Herb planned to file for bankruptcy and would not remain liable
for the debt.10
The court also considered the parenting plan and set Herb’s child
support and maintenance payments to Anne.11 The court determined that
Herb earned $175,000 annually, including $100,000 in self-reported
employment income and $75,000 in gifts given to Herb by his mother,
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.101(2) (2012).
No. DA 15–0292, ___ P.3d ___, 2015 WL 9484544 (Mont. Dec. 29, 2015).
3
Id. ¶¶ 2–7.
4
Id. ¶¶ 2.
5
Id.¶ 4.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. ¶ 1.
9
Id. ¶ 10.
10
Id.
11
Id. ¶ 11.
1
2
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Leslie Douglass (“Bunny”).12 Bunny gave the family $75,000 each year
for several years, but when the couple separated, she decreased her
annual gift to $30,000, which she gave directly to Herb.13
Herb appealed, raising two issues: (1) that the district court
erroneously calculated his income to set child support and maintenance
payments; and (2) that the district court erred and/or abused its discretion
in apportioning marital assets and debts.14 Through counsel, Bunny filed
an amicus brief supporting Herb’s argument that her annual gifts to him
should not be considered income for purposes of child support or
maintenance payments.15
II. HOLDINGS
A. Calculation of Income
The Court devoted the majority of its analysis to Herb’s
argument that the district court erred in calculating his income to set
child support and maintenance payments.16 Herb argued that the court
erred twice: first, in imputing to him an annual earning capacity of
$100,000; and second, in imputing $75,000 in income based on Bunny’s
gifts to him and the family.17
The Court held that the district court properly estimated Herb’s
earning capacity to be $100,000.18 At trial, Anne argued that Herb earned
or could earn greater than $400,000, and Herb claimed that he could earn
less than $60,000 annually.19 Applying Montana statutes and
administrative rules,20 the Court determined that the district court
properly considered not only Herb’s actual employment income but his
earning ability, affirming the court’s imputation of $100,000 in earning
capacity.21
The Court next considered an issue of first impression: should
gifts be included within income for the purpose of setting child support
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3, 6.
14
Id. ¶¶ 12–15.
15
Id. ¶ 12.
16
Id. ¶¶ 18–42.
17
Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
18
Id. ¶ 26.
19
Id. ¶ 23.
20
Id. ¶¶ 21–22. Separate statutes and rules govern calculation of maintenance and child support
payments. Regarding maintenance, Montana Code Annotated § 40–4–203(2) provides that a court
should consider the “ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought.” (2015) (emphasis
added). Section 40–4–204 similarly requires the court to consider any and all relevant factors in
setting child support. For the purposes of determining child support, the Administrative Rules of
Montana expressly obligate the court to consider imputed as well as actual income, authorizing the
imputation of income when a parent is not employed to her fullest capacity. Mont. Admin. R.
37.62.105, 37.62.106.
21
Paschen, ¶ 26.
12
13
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and/or maintenance payments?22 Reversing the district court on this
issue, it held that they should not. The Court’s analysis closely tracked
Bunny’s amicus brief, which offered two lines of reasoning.23 First, the
Court examined the history of the child support guidelines to conclude
the governing administrative bodies24 intentionally excluded gifts from
the definition of income.25 Second, the Court considered the reasoning of
other states that have refused to include gifts in calculating income.26
Historically, Montana expressly included “gifts and prizes”
within income,27 but as the regulations evolved between 1992 and 2012,
gifts were no longer included in the regulations’ non-exhaustive list of
income sources.28 Following the rules of statutory interpretation, which
prevent the court from “insert[ing] what has been omitted,”29 the Court
“decline[d] to re-insert ‘gifts’” into the statutes and regulations
governing child support.30
The Court found support for its holding in other jurisdictions.31
Where statutory or regulatory law does not expressly authorize
inclusion,32 courts are divided.33 Because a donor has “no legal
obligation to continue” gifts, the Court determined that including gifts in
income for purposes of setting child support would be “fundamentally
unfair.”34 The Court similarly held that gifts could not be included in
income to set maintenance payments because “there is no guarantee that
[a spouse] will continue to receive substantial gifts . . . into the
foreseeable future.”35 The Court held that the district court erred by
including $75,000 in annual gifts in Herb’s income.36
B. Apportionment of the Marital Estate
Id. ¶ 27.
Leslie Douglass’s Amicus Curiae Brief, Paschen v. Paschen, 2015 WL 5547374 (Mont. Dec. 29,
2015) (No. DA–15–0292).
24
The Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services governed the child support
guidelines until 1995, when the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services assumed
control.
25
Paschen, ¶¶ 28–33.
26
Id. ¶¶ 34–37.
27
Id. ¶ 28 (citing Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1513(1)(a), (b) (1990).
28
Id. ¶ 28–30 (citing Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1508, 46.30.1513 (1992); Mont. Admin. R. (1998);
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.105, 37.62.106 (2012)).
29
Mont. Code Ann. § 1–2–101.
30
Paschen, ¶ 33.
31
Id.¶ 34–37.
32
For examples of schemes including gifts within income, see Ga. Code Ann. § 19–6–
15(f)(1)(A)(xviii) (2014); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1240–2–4–.04(3)(a)(1)(xviii) (2008),
https://perma.cc/CLG8-DUWT; Ind. Child Support R. & Guidelines 3(A)(1) (2016),
https://perma.cc/35DR-8CWL; Va. Code Ann. § 20–108.2.C (2015).
33
Paschen ¶¶ 34–36 (contrasting California and Missouri, which broadly interpret income to include
gifts, with Alaska and Maine, which have refused to do so). See In re Marriage of Alter, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 849 (2009); Petersen v. Petersen, 22 S.W.3d 760 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Nass v. Seaton, 904
P.2d 412 (Alaska 1995); True v. True, 615 A.2d 252 (Me. 1992).
34
Paschen, ¶ 37.
35
Id. ¶ 38.
36
Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
22
23
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The Court held the district court did not err in apportioning
marital debts and assets.37 Because the parties presented the district court
with conflicting evidence, and the district court, as finder of fact,
determined that Herb was not a credible witness, the lower court enjoys
substantial deference.38
III. ANALYSIS
The Court’s holding that gifts are not includable in income is
problematic.39 The lower court likely erred in imputing significantly
more income in annual gifts to Herb than the evidence supported.40 But
instead of correcting the district court’s calculation, the Court
categorically ruled that gifts may never be included in income for the
purposes of child support and maintenance payments. The Court’s
opinion conflicts with statutory and regulatory authority, the policies
guiding calculation of child support, and the common-law majority rule.
A. Statutes and Regulations
1. Child Support
In setting child support, Montana statute requires that courts
“consider all relevant factors, including: the financial resources of the
parents [and] the standard of living that the child would have enjoyed
had the marriage not been dissolved.”41 The child support regulations are
more concrete, providing that “[i]ncome for child support includes actual
income, imputed income . . . , or any combination thereof which fairly
reflects a parent’s resources available for child support.”42 Actual income
is defined as “economic benefit from whatever source derived, except as
excluded” elsewhere within the same regulation.43 Gifts are not an
enumerated exception within the child support guidelines.44
The Court appropriately considered the rules of construction,
citing Montana Code Annotated § 1–2–101: “In the construction of a
statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is
Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
Id.
39
Analysis is limited to the single issue of whether gifts should be included in income for
determining child support and maintenance payments. The Court did not devote considerable
analysis to Herb’s imputed income or to the apportionment of marital debts and assets, and its
determination of these issues is consistent with well-settled law.
40
The Court imputed $75,000 in income to Herb based on Bunny’s annual gifts between 2007 and
2010. Bunny gave to Herb $30,000 annually following the couple’s separation. Paschen, ¶¶ 3, 6.
41
Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–204(2)(b), (c).
42
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.105(1).
43
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.105(2)(a).
44
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.105(3).
37
38

2015

CASENOTE; PASCHEN V. PASCHEN

249

in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted or to omit what has been inserted.”45 Although the Court
determined that it should not “reinsert ‘gifts’” under this rule,46 the same
rule of construction supports the opposing argument. Income is defined
broadly within the regulations, mirroring the definition of gross income
within the federal tax code.47 The tax code’s gift exemptions,48 however,
suggest gifts would otherwise fit within broad definition of income. If the
Court should not insert gifts into the definition of income, it also should
not insert them into the exclusions. The definition of actual income
within the regulations is expansive. Because gifts are an “economic
benefit,” and because the source of the economic benefit is by definition
irrelevant, the plain meaning of the child support guidelines support
inclusion.
Another rule of statutory construction lends support to this
argument. “The maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius (the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) is routinely cited in
Montana case law.”49 Although the guidelines do not expressly foreclose
the possibility of other exceptions to income, they also do not invite
expansion. In contrast, where income is defined, the same regulation
provides that income “includes but is not limited to” certain enumerated
examples.50 By setting forth specific, limited exceptions to income, the
regulation implies that gifts should be included in income. 51
The Court looked beyond the plain meaning of the regulations
and into their history. In 1990, the Administrative Rules of Montana
expressly included gifts within gross income.52 When the Montana
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services amended the rules in
1992, it removed gifts as a source of income, reasoning that “one-time
gifts and inheritances, except for income derived from their investment,
are not income. To include . . . one-time sources of funds would result in
a skewed application of the guidelines.”53 Later amendments to the
regulations did not revert to the earlier regulatory scheme. 54

Paschen, ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 33.
47
26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012).
48
26 U.S.C. § 102(a).
49
Carbon Cnty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 684 (Mont. 1995).
50
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.105(2)(a).
51
Where expression unius est exclusion alterius applies, the Court applies the maxim to infer that the
legislative body intended a rule’s omissions, as well as its inclusions. See Dukes v. City of Missoula,
119 P.3d 61, 64–65 (Mont. 2005) (holding that the Scaffolding Act, which creates liability for
contractors, subcontractors, and builders, does not lead to liability to other entities, including
counties, cities, towns, or villages).
52
Mont. Admin. R. 46.30.1513(1)(a), (b) (1990).
53
5 Mont. Admin. Reg. 408 (Mar. 12, 1992).
54
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.106 (1998); 37.63.105 (2012).
45
46
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Although this history suggests that the governing bodies55
wished to limit the inclusion of gifts, it does not support the Court’s
holding that gifts are never includable. Rather, it indicates that a court
should determine whether a gift is a single, isolated event before
determining child support. Additionally, it shows that the regulators had
the opportunity to exclude all gifts from income and chose not to do so.
Where, as in Paschen, the gifts are regular and continuous, inclusion
reflects the actual finances of the parent and does not “result in a skewed
application of the guidelines.”56
2. Maintenance
Analysis of the relevant authority on maintenance payments
leads to a similar result. Where maintenance is appropriate, the court
should “consider[] all relevant factors, including: the financial resources
of the party seeking maintenance . . . ; the standard of living established
during the marriage . . . ; and the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet the spouse’s own needs while meeting
those of the spouse seeking maintenance.”57 The statute requires the
court to fully consider the parties’ resources. Because regular gifts may
substantially alter those resources, gifts should be considered in setting
maintenance payments.
B. Equity and the Policies Guiding Child Support
Divorce actions are governed by equity, and a court’s
determination of income must serve that end.58 “A court sitting in equity
causes is empowered to . . . render justice between the parties[.]”59 A
court should have the power to look into a party’s actual financial
situation and beyond the simple question of whether the money was
given as a gift. It is easy to imagine a case even more compelling than
Paschen. For example, a parent from a wealthy family might choose not
to work, living exclusively off of gifts from her own parents.
Additionally, a parent receiving substantial gifts could be in a markedly
better financial situation than his former spouse but still be entitled to
payments. The court determining child support and maintenance must be

The Montana Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services governed the child support
guidelines until 1995, when the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services assumed
control.
56
5 Mont. Admin. Reg. 408 (Mar. 12, 1992).
57
Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–203(2)(a), (c), (f).
58
In re Marriage of Parrish, 763 P.2d 658, 661 (Mont. 1988); In re Marriage of Stevens, 253 P.3d
877, 880 (Mont. 2011).
59
Rase v. Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc., 631 P.2d 680, 687 (Mont. 1981);
55
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able to look into the substance rather than the form of a party’s resources
in order to reach an equitable end for children and former spouses.60
Not only is the exclusion of gifts potentially inequitable, it
conflicts with the policy of child support clearly expressed in the
regulations. Montana’s child support guidelines “are based on the
principle that it is the first priority of parents to meet the needs of the
child according to the financial ability of the parents. . . . [A] child’s
standard of living should not, to the degree possible, be adversely
affected because a child’s parents are not living in the same
household.”61 If a parent receives regular annual gifts, a court cannot
accurately determine that parent’s financial ability to provide for her
child without considering those gifts. By excluding regular gifts from
income, courts will fail to equitably distribute marital resources and meet
the best interests of the child.
C. The Law of Other States
The Court supported its reasoning by looking to the law of other
states. The highest courts of Alaska and Maine have declined to include
gifts despite a broad definition of income, reasoning that to do so would
lead to administrative burden and a potentially inequitable result.62
Alaska and Maine are in the minority, however.63 Even though most state
guidelines do not address whether income includes gifts,64 the majority
rule includes gifts so long as they are “regularly received from a
dependable source.”65 Other courts have held that, although gifts are not

Mont. Code Ann. § 1–3–219 (“The law respects form less than substance.”). See also Pomeroy v.
Sallaz, 498 P.2d 1211 (Mont. 1972) (“[I]n equity, substance, not form, controls.”).
61
Mont. Admin. R. 37.62.101.
62
Nass, 904 P.2d at 416 (“We are persuaded that any [approach other than excluding gifts and
inheritances] blurs the easily administered and well-established historical distinction between gifts
and earned income.”); True, 615 A.2d at 253 (holding that gifts should not be included in the income
of the spouse seeking maintenance because “there is no legal obligation on the part of the [donor] to
pay the money.”).
63
LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES INTERPRETATION & APPLICATION § 4.07(O)
(2015) (“Most states have held that where gifts are continuous and predictable, they may be
considered income.”).
64
Steven K. Berenson, Economic Windfalls and Child Support: How Should Gifts, Inheritances, and
Prizes be Treated?, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 701, 704 (2014).
65
In re Marriage of Nimmo, 891 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Barnier v. Wells,
476 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). See also MORGAN, supra note 63 § 4.07(O);
Cummings v. Cummings, 897 P.2d 685 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Ford v. Ford, 65 S.W.3d 432 (Ark.
2002); In re Marriage of Williamson, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699 (2014); Zahringer v. Zahringer, 815
A.2d 75 (Conn. 2003); Ordini v. Ordini, 701 So. 2d 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re Marriage of
Rogers, 802 N.E.2d 1247 (Ill. 2003); Sells v. Sells, 669 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa App. 2003); Penner v.
Penner, 411 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. Ct. App 2013); Petrini v. Petrini, 648 A.2d 1016 (Md. 1994); Andrews
v. Andrews, 289 S.W.3d 7171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Mellen v. Mellen, 688 N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999); State v. Williams, 635 S.E.2d 496 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Kiehborth v. Kiehborth,
862 N.E.2d 863 (2006); Schinner v. Schinner, 420 N.W.2d 382 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
60

252

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 76

income, they may be a reason to deviate from the regulations or statutes
to reach an equitable result.66
Although the Court is free to adopt a minority position, there is a
clear reason why the majority of states have held otherwise: equity
demands a full and complete inquiry into each party’s available
resources. Because regularly given gifts materially enhance a parent’s
ability to support her child financially, their categorical exclusion from
income interferes with the guiding principles of child support.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s holding may lead to significant abuse of the system
by parents who seek child support and maintenance payments as well as
those who seek to avoid paying. Although the district court likely erred
in its calculation of income, the Court’s holding does far more than
correct an error; it opens a loophole. As it looked deeply into the history
of the child support guidelines, the Court missed what is clear at first
glance. An incomplete view of a parent’s finances will result in an
inequitable result—a result that conflicts with the principles of child
support and maintenance.

Styka v. Styka, 972 P.2d 16 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998); Suzanne D. v. Stephen W., 65 A.3d 965 (Pa.
2013).
66

